The invading armed formations on the territory of the Belgorod region, the majority of domestic experts called the DRG – sabotage and reconnaissance groups. However, the DRG is just a few people who are covertly (we emphasize – covertly) are thrown across the front line with the task of putting out of action (for example, by undermining) a particularly important object. Then the group should just as secretly return back to the point of permanent deployment. One of the most important commandments of the special forces during the execution of the task is “entered the battle – failed the task.”

But when an armed formation of a company and above enters the country with shooting and armored vehicles, then these are by no means saboteurs or terrorists.

And this simple fact must be understood once and for all. As you know, it is correct to name – correctly understand – correctly act.

And now let’s deal with the accusations against the border service thrown during these discussions.

The most important thing to note is that the protection of the state border and its defense are fundamentally different things. Security is the work of border guards, but defense is already the Ministry of Defense, that is, a function of the Armed Forces.

In a word, defense is not the task of the border troops (Border Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia). And it is not worth blaming the FSB PS for somehow not repelling the invasion of the enemy’s combined arms formations.

Recall that during the years of the existence of the USSR, when protecting the state border, the operational-military method (method) was mainly practiced. However, in the early 2000s, it was believed that threats to Russia‘s security in the border area were predominantly non-military in nature – and it was concluded that the use of military uniforms and methods of action in the fight against cross-border crime was ineffective and costly. And somewhere since 2003, the border service began to switch to a purely operational method of protecting the state border.

For that period of time it was logical. But since then the situation has changed significantly.

And, quite possibly, approaches to the protection of the state border should be reviewed in favor of the operational-military method (method). And again, not in all sections of the border, but only in those where the situation is unfavorable. At the same time, it is worth recalling that even the transition to the operational-military method (method) of protecting the state border does not mean the participation of border guards in combined arms battles and operations when repelling an enemy invasion. This only means strengthening the capabilities of the FPS in the fight against the DRG and gangs.

Among other things, it is worth recalling that the border troops conduct reconnaissance in a 100-kilometer strip of a neighboring state and must warn of possible aggressive intentions on the part of the enemy. Whether they warned about the impending enemy invasion of the Belgorod region is an open question.

Concluding the conversation about the border service, it is necessary to note the following. There is a strong opinion among the broadest masses that with the outbreak of hostilities, border guards must defend every inch of their native land to the last drop of blood (basically, such an idea was formed on the examples of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War).

In this regard, let’s clarify what a border outpost is. In terms of numbers and armament, it roughly corresponds to a rifle company. By definition, the outpost cannot bring any tangible harm to the advancing armored and mechanized formations of the enemy. But to die at the same time in full force – maybe.

Therefore, any participation of frontier outposts in combat operations of a combined arms nature is inappropriate.

It is more logical to use the personnel of the FPS units, fighters and commanders after the enemy’s aggression as units to maintain the regime of the front line and protect the rear of the army in the field.

Therefore, with the outbreak of hostilities, it is more expedient for the border guards, together with their dogs, to retreat to the rear in an organized manner, and not to die in battle in full force without any tangible benefit for the further course of events.

Now about territorial defense, since during the discussions in the expert community this question was repeatedly raised approximately in the following interpretation – “What about our therodefence?” into battle with the enemy.

To begin with, many representatives of the expert community should look at Article 22 of the Federal Law “On Defense” of 05/31/1996 N 61-FZ (with all the latest changes and additions), which gives a clear and unambiguous definition of territorial defense. You have to bring it in full.

Territorial defense – a system of measures taken during the period of martial law for the protection and defense of military, important state and special facilities, facilities that ensure the vital activity of the population, the functioning of transport, communications and communications, energy facilities, facilities that pose an increased danger to life and human health and for the natural environment, to combat sabotage and reconnaissance units of foreign states and illegal armed groups, to identify, prevent, suppress, minimize and (or) eliminate the consequences of their sabotage, reconnaissance and terrorist activities in order to create favorable conditions for the functioning of these facilities and the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and special formations created for wartime.

Let us pay special attention to the fact that territorial defense is carried out on the territory of the Russian Federation or in its individual areas where martial law has been introduced, taking into account the measures applied during the period of martial law.

And no one introduced martial law in the Belgorod region.

Therefore, all talk about the effectiveness / inefficiency of territorial defense in this case does not make any sense. In conclusion, we recall that in the military districts of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation a plan for the territorial defense of the military district is being developed, for the implementation of the provisions of which the commander of the district troops is responsible. And by and large, territorial defense is of a police nature, and to repel an enemy invasion, it is necessary to take measures of a completely different nature.

Now about the calls of some figures to distribute small arms, grenade launchers and anti-tank missile systems to the population of the border regions of Russia. By themselves, such proposals should be considered, as they say, out of the ordinary. Let us recall that this was not the case even during the most intense periods of the Great Patriotic War.

Therefore, such appeals should be treated categorically negatively (for starters, just beat on the lips just for such ideas).

The implementation of such proposals in practice can lead (and even unequivocally lead) to all sorts of unrest and disorder. And the widest sections of the population, voluntarily or involuntarily, the question arises – “What about our army? And where is she?

Therefore, the elimination of enemy armed formations that have invaded the territory of the Russian Federation is a purely Armed Forces business, and only a combined arms commander (commander) should be in charge of such actions (operations), in operational subordination of which should be units of other power structures. This is the only possible way. All the rest are false.

The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.

Author biography:

Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok – military observer for Gazeta, retired colonel.

Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986). Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980–1983). Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986–1988). Senior officer of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992). Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992–2000). Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998). Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).