It would seem that if all the applications of official Kyiv for supplies from the United States and other NATO member states of weapons, military and special equipment (VVST) were satisfied in full, then armed struggle during a special military operation could hypothetically take a completely different turn – and it cannot be ruled out that the hostilities would have ended in a very short time with the success of Ukraine. MLRS HIMARS. At this point in time, the Pentagon has transferred to Ukraine a total of 38 such machines. But even the 16 HIMARS installations originally delivered to the Armed Forces of Ukraine brought a lot of trouble to the armed forces of the Russian Federation. If the United States had sharply increased the supply of MLRS HIMARS and missiles to them, this could lead, if not to a radical change in the course of hostilities, then to a significant change in the situation on the line of contact in favor of Kyiv.
However, despite all the requests of Ukraine to provide as many weapons as possible, good and different, the transfer of weapons and military equipment to the armed forces of Ukraine is carried out in a very dosed manner. A number of samples of weapons and military equipment, repeatedly requested by official Kyiv, are not supplied to the armed forces of Ukraine at all. These primarily include main battle tanks, modern infantry fighting vehicles, multifunctional fighters.
The question arises – why the West does not supply the armed forces of Ukraine, for example, 500 M1 Abrams tanks (some – in the M1A2SEP version v.3) and Leopard 2A5 (and why not in the Leopard 2A7+ variant), several hundred Marder and M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, or 100 F-15E Strike Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon fighters. After all, fears that such a transfer of equipment will lead to a third world war and an exchange of nuclear missile strikes are quite groundless. In addition, the opinions and assessments in the West regarding the second army of the world after March-April 2022 were significantly corrected.
The explanations that Ukraine needs an advance and a long deployment of a technical support and maintenance system, as well as a lot of time will be spent on retraining Ukrainian tankers.
Roughly the same applies to the supply of combat aircraft. The situation in this area, of course, is much more complicated, but the difficulties with the development of Western aircraft technology are clearly and deliberately exaggerated by many experts. It would be difficult to train Africans from scratch as pilots of multifunctional fighters, and in Ukraine there are more than enough qualified flight personnel, and there is no shortage of engineering and technical personnel. And to master, for example, the Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II subsonic attack aircraft (which the United States has already planned to decommission and write off several times) Ukrainians could fully master in a couple of months.
Even more fantastic are the explanations that the supply of military equipment to Ukraine will significantly weaken the defense capability of Western countries.
Thus, the supply of weapons, military and special equipment to Ukraine is currently carried out to such an extent and in such a timeframe that provide Kyiv with the opportunity at least not to lose in this conflict.
In this connection, one more circumstance should be mentioned. Ukraine in the course of the implementation of Russia‘s special military operation is more than a favorable territory for testing the most modern models of military and military equipment of the Western countries. It would be a categorically wrong decision not to use this kind of training ground for the United States and other NATO member states. For any weapon, the most important test is combat use and operation in combat conditions (primarily this concerns the repair and return of weapons to service).
Check the laudatory statements of development enterprises about their vehicles in peacetime very difficult to obtain. Only a considerable amount of equipment involved in battles, and a long period of its operation in combat conditions, make it possible to obtain more or less reliable statistics. make, if necessary, constructive changes and clarify conceptual views in matters of combat use.
It seems that the West in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict proceeds from the following the defeat of Ukraine (but at the same time preventing the imminent military success of Kyiv), by any possible means to prevent a military victory for Russia, to transfer the armed confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv into a manageable phase and stretch it out in time for as long as possible.
The result is seen as follows – to weaken Russia as much as possible, to put a final end to the political ambitions of the Kremlin as a world power, moreover, deprive Moscow of the status of even a regional power, bring the country as smoothly as possible to a change in political regime and subsequently deprive it of the right to possess nuclear weapons. It is quite obvious that such goals and objectives never become known to the general public and the media.
It is more than likely that this geopolitical dish is being prepared by the West precisely at such an angle, degree and timing.
Cunning chefs throw various kinds of spices into the boiling broth of the armed confrontation. They either increase the spiciness of the prepared dish, or skillfully reduce it. Either they throw wood on the fire, or they skillfully stop the flaring flame. already determined) bringing the dish to its final readiness, but exclusively – and this is the main thing – on a slow fire.
It should be noted that the management of such processes is very difficult – previously unpredictable situations may arise and a whole squadron of black swans , and events in the end can easily get out of control and further develop according to owls.
Nevertheless, according to Western analysts, a quick military victory for Ukraine could lead not to the planned collapse of the political regime in Russia, but directly to the opposite result – the rallying of the broad masses around -political leadership.
But the skillful prolongation of the armed conflict (along with the growing sanctions pressure) will inevitably lead to an increase in the hardships and hardships of Russian citizens.
Such orchestration of the conflict may well lead to an explosive growth of discontent and unpredictable consequences for the ruling elites. That is, a hypothetical change of power can occur (again, according to the calculations of Western experts) without any external interference and influence.
situation is not yet visible. It seems that the opinion expressed by Mark Milli is based on these theses.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.